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Abstract
Economic inefficiencies are often attributed to ill-defined property rights.  However, perfectly-
defined property rights will not necessarily lead to economic efficiency.  Rather, some resources
are more efficiently exploited if jointly owned by a large group of persons, while others are more
efficiently exploited if divided up and distributed to individual parties.  We present an economic
framework whereby the efficiency of a property rights regime is couched in terms of the optimal
level of dispersion of a bundle of property right "sticks," and the party or parties that will make
the most efficient use of those "sticks."  A low level of dispersion indicates that a bundle of rights
associated with a resource is relatively intact and consolidated.  When such a consolidated bundle
is held by a very large group of persons, we have a property rights regime akin to open access,
which is prone to overexploitation of the resource, or a "tragedy of the commons."  Such a regime
is characterized by many persons holding coterminous and indivisible rights of use, and none
having any effective right of exclusion.  The antithesis of this situation is where the bundle of
rights to a resource is dispersed among multiple individuals, such that no individual has an
effective right of use and each has an effective right of exclusion, resulting in chronic
underexploitation, or what has been called a "tragedy of the anticommons."  An example of this
can be found in the commercial shopping district in Moscow, where different parties may hold
separate rights to use, sell, lease and hold title to a parcel of commercial property, with the result
that the property goes unused.
The juxtaposition between the two "tragedies" is in two dimensions, however: (i) the level of
dispersion of the property rights and (ii) the level of aggregation of the parties holding the rights.
Our framework posits two other property rights regimes that mix characteristics of the open
access and anticommons regimes.  When a consolidated bundle of rights to an asset is vested in an
individual, we have a "private property" regime, where the private property owner enjoys great
freedom in the use of her property, relatively unfettered by regulatory restrictions.  When a bundle
of rights to an asset is dispersed but the dispersed rights are held by a very large group, we have a
"regulatory regime," where ownership of an asset is subject to restrictions, which are in effect
rights held by a regulatory agency on behalf of the large group.  Which of these property regimes
is most efficient depends upon several case and resource-specific factors, such as the transactions
costs of agreeing upon a common property management scheme, the transaction costs of
"rebundling" a set of dispersed rights, the transaction costs of organizing a large group to assert
the group's rights, and the magnitude of externalities resulting from the exercise of private
property rights.Introduction
The "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin) has become almost a cliché as a reference to the
maladies of ill-defined property rights or open-access resources.  However, some scholarly work
has now shown that in some situations, institutions that sustain efficient resource exploitation can
emerge from open access situations (Ostrom).  Other property rights arrangements, as well, have
been praised and maligned, but conclusions regarding efficiency are usually dependent upon case-
and resource-specific factors.  More general statements regarding the efficiency of property rights
regimes are lacking.
We present a framework for analyzing the efficiency of different property rights regimes in
terms of the optimal level of dispersion of a bundle of property right "sticks," and the party or
parties that will make the most efficient use of those "sticks."  A low level of dispersion signifies
that the bundle of rights associated with a resource is relatively intact and consolidated, meaning
that the party or parties holding those sticks have relatively complete control over the use and
disposition of the resource.  By contrast, a high level of dispersion indicates that the property
rights sticks associated with the resource have been spread out among two or more parties,
meaning that different parties hold separate and discrete rights to the resource, and that the
resource-owner, if there is one, is subject to a number of restrictions.  As well, the property rights
associated with an asset, whether dispersed or not, can be held by individual parties or by large
groups of persons.  Both the level of dispersion of property rights sticks and the level of
aggregation of the parties holding the sticks bear on the efficiency with which a resource is
exploited.  Clearly, the optimal levels of dispersion and of aggregation of rights-holders will vary
from case to case.  It is worth noting, as well, that the allocation of property rights implicates
important issues other than economic ones, such as the strong association that American society2
makes between political liberty and private property (Friedman).
We present a framework consisting of four extreme property rights regimes: (i) an open
access regime, where the sticks are highly consolidated and vested in a very large group of
parties; (ii) a "private property" regime, where the sticks are highly consolidated and vested in an
individual party; (iii) an "anticommons" regime, where the sticks are highly dispersed and vested
in multiple individual parties; and (iv) a "regulatory" regime, where the sticks are highly dispersed
and at least some of the sticks are vested in a very large group of parties.  Each of these regimes is
discussed in detail below.
Open Access
We define the open access regime as any situation where a large group of persons jointly
hold the same indivisible right to a resource.  There is a significant difference between open access
and common property, in that the latter is still owned by a group of persons, while the former is
not owned at all by anybody (Bromley).  In the purest form of open access, such as an
unregulated fishery, the group of persons holding rights to the resource is the universe of all
persons, and each person has a right to use the resource as she wishes.  In other words, every
person in the universe jointly holds the entire bundle of rights to the resource.  This extreme case
is the best illustration of this regime, although for purposes of our framework common-pool
resources that are exploited by a large group of persons also meet the criteria for this regime. 
While the process by which the "tragedy" of over-exploitation of common-pool resources
is well-known (Hardin, Gordon), exploitation can be sustained at a collectively optimal level
where the joint owners of the resource are able to establish an effective governance institution for
management of the common-pool resource (Ostrom).  In such cases, a common-property regime3
may be preferable to other regimes, particularly if the resource is best exploited by utilizing
economies of scale, rather than partitioning the resource into smaller private rights.  This tends to
be true when externalities will cross any private property boundaries that might be established
(Ellickson).  Also, some resource exploitation systems such as irrigation systems require an
infrastructure that is labor- or capital-intensive to construct, such that a cooperative effort is
needed in at least the initial stages of resource exploitation.  Finally, common-property ownership
may be the most effective way of protecting rights that vest in a large, unorganized public, as in
the case of the public trust doctrine.  "Inherently public" resources such as navigable waterways,
that derive their value from their public nature, require common-property ownership to avoid the
market failure that would occur should a private party be allowed to capture the rents from use of
the resource (Rose).
Private Property
Private property exists when a resource is owned by a non-governmental entity, and is
relatively unencumbered by regulatory restrictions.  Complete title to real property such that a
landowner has unfettered discretion over its use, has rarely existed.  For example, land ownership
has been encumbered by prohibitions on common law nuisances for centuries.  Private property in
its more moderate forms, however, is believed to be efficient because it provides incentives for
property owners to make the most efficient use of their property by allowing them to capture all
of the benefits of capital investment (Demsetz).
The disadvantage of private property is that it ignores the externalities associated with
resource use.  While private property advocates argue that the parties can engage in Coasian
bargaining to achieve an efficient outcome, affected parties often cannot overcome the transaction4
costs associated with the bargaining process.  Thus, evaluating the efficiency implications of a
private property regime necessitates a comparison of the magnitude of the externality resulting
from unregulated resource use with the transaction costs of organizing those negatively affected
by the resource use.
Anticommons
Heller has identified a property rights dilemma that he calls the "tragedy of the
anticommons."  In the shopping district in Moscow, potentially valuable storefront properties
remain curiously under-utilized while street merchants do a thriving business on the sidewalks
from their informal outdoor kiosks.  The reason for this anomaly is that in the transition from a
centrally-planned economy to a market economy, the Russian Republic clumsily privatized
storefronts by distributing to private parties the different rights formerly held by Soviet
bureaucracies.  Thus, a particular storefront may have different parties holding separate rights to
use, sell, lease, and hold title to the property, as well as separate rights to any sale proceeds or
lease proceeds.  Heuristically, this can be thought of as an extreme dispersal or unbundling of the
different property right "sticks" in a property owner's bundle of rights.  Unless one of the parties
can rebundle the different rights, the property will remain unused, which has been the case in
much of Moscow's shopping district.  Note that the term "anticommons" appropriately reflects the
juxtaposition between this regime and the open access regime -- in an anticommons, each party
holds a right of exclusion, and no single party holds an effective use right, while in open access,
each party holds a use right and no party holds any exclusion right.
We define an anticommons as any property rights regime where multiple individual parties
hold separate and divisible
1 rights to a resource.  Other examples of anticommons regimes are5
found in a variety of settings.  The transferability of water rights in the Western U.S. are often
subject to the condition that the transfer not adversely affect the rights of third parties (Colby). 
Granting such a veto power in disparate individual third parties is a critical unbundling of the
water rights held by the transferor, and creates an anticommons in the sense that rights are
dispersed and held by disaggregated individuals.
2   In this case, however, water tends to be
underused not in a physical sense, but in an economic sense; the individual retaining the
usufructuary right is inhibited from moving it to higher-valued uses, though not from using it
herself.  This allocative inefficiency is western water is well-documented (Gardner and Fullerton).
 Another example might be found in some land use planning commissions, which allow multiple
parties to block development through the planning approval process (Heller).  Again, it is the
vesting of some form of a veto right in third parties that creates the anticommons.
Although an anticommons regime may result in chronic underuse or non-use of a resource,
it also incorporates some desirable characteristics, such as its propensity to assuage distributional
concerns.  Granting multiple parties some veto power or exclusion power guarantees that only
Pareto superior measures are undertaken, not just potentially Pareto-improving measures. 
Another advantage of the anticommons regime is that it protects third parties from negative
externalities stemming from resource use.  For example, the transaction costs imposed by third-
party rights to protest water transfers may act as a proxy for externalities that would not
otherwise be considered by the parties to the transfer (Colby).  Similarly, the anticommons
created by some land-use planning commissions that effectively grant standing to environmental
organizations provide a means of expressing economic values for open space that may not
otherwise be expressed through markets or through the political process.  A final advantage of the
anticommons regime is that if the transaction costs of rebundling rights are low, then the resource6
should flow to its most valuable use.
Regulatory Regime
A "regulatory regime" is a regime in which "everyone always has rights respecting the
objects in the regime, and no one … is ever privileged to use any of them except as particularly
authorized by the others" (Michelman).  Our framework contemplates that a regulatory regime
exists when private property rights are significantly attenuated by regulatory restrictions.  These
restrictions constitute an "unbundling" of sticks in that the right to certain uses of a resource are
separated from the resource itself.  An example of this occurs when Endangered Species Act
regulations prohibit a private landowner from developing her property.  The property right "stick"
of developing one's property is thus taken from the property owner's bundle of rights, and held by
the regulatory agency for the benefit of the general public.  Of course, this is not to say that the
regulatory agency can exercise that right; but by holding it as a trustee of sorts, it can prevent the
property owner or others from exercising it.  In the extreme, a regulatory regime is a totalitarian
state in which the regulator holds virtually all rights to all resources.
A regulatory regime may cure the ills of a private property regime.  When the transaction
costs of organizing parties affected by an externality are too high, imposing regulatory restrictions
or a Pigouvian tax will cause the private property owner to equate her marginal private benefit
with the marginal social benefit.  Were all regulatory agencies perfect social welfare-maximizing
agencies, the regulatory regime would always be the most efficient property rights regime. 
However, this is not necessarily true in a government where regulatory failures occur, such as the
propensity of regulators to discount private costs, or suffer "fiscal illusion," (Blume, et. al) or for
a regulator to become captured by a politically powerful regulated party (Stigler) or for a7
regulator to have an alternative objective such as budget-maximization rather than welfare-
maximization (Niskanen).
The drawbacks of the regulatory regime are thus of a political or public policy nature. 
However, regulators typically conduct, prior to commencing a project, a cost-benefit analysis
which compares the financial pros and cons of a proposed regulatory measure with the status quo,
which usually most resembles the private property regime.  This is at least an agreed-upon metric
for determining the net gains of a policy measure, and can be used to determine if the regulator
has strayed from the social optimum.  Done properly, this may also be a means of determining the
extent of deadweight loss incurred by society because of regulatory failures.
Comparing the Efficiency of the Four Property Rights Regimes
Clearly, none of the property rights regimes exist in a pure form, but any policy measure
can be characterized as a movement along a spectrum of rights dispersal or party aggregation, or
both.  Table 1 contains a summary of the characteristics, advantages and problems associated with
each of the property rights regimes.
To better compare the alternative property rights regimes, we consider one particular type
of resource problem.  We assume that increasing resource exploitation gives rise to linearly
declining marginal private benefits and linearly increasing marginal social costs.  A linear marginal
benefits curve means that average private benefits are also linearly declining, at twice the slope of
the marginal benefits curve.  Without loss of generality, we assume zero marginal costs of
resource exploitation.  These assumptions are depicted in figure 1.
Figure 1 also specifies characteristic equilibria for each of the four property rights regimes,
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Definition: complete freedom of
use associated with a resource
Problem: high externalities caused
by unfettered use of asset
Advantages: fully efficient use of
private property
Ex.: ownership of personal
property
Open Access
Definition: multiple parties have
coterminous rights of use of a
resource; none have a right of
exclusion
Problem: resource overuse
resulting from strategic behavior;
transaction costs in establishing
resource governance institution
Advantages: scale economies of
ownership
Ex.: tragedy of the commons in
fisheries, grazing9
For an anticommons, the characteristic equilibrium is complete non-use of the resource, the fate
that has befallen storefront properties in Moscow; hence the default equlibrium is shown at the
origin, where resource use is zero.  In open access, resource exploitation occurs at the level at
which average private benefits equal marginal costs (zero in our model), a condition well-known
as rent dissipation (Gordon).  Private property gives rise to the familiar condition that marginal



















qAC = Anticommons Characteristic Equilibrium
qRR = Regulatory Regime Characteristic Equilibrium
qPP = Private Property Characteristic Equilibrium
qOS = Open Access Characteristic Equilibrium
Figure 1.
regime is where marginal private benefits equal marginal social costs.  Although it is probably rare
that the regulator achieves a perfectly optimal level of regulation, there is no reason to believe that
the bias is towards either too much or too little regulation.  We can now compare the relative
efficiencies of the property rights regimes.  Non-quantifiable considerations such as distributional
concerns (which are best addressed by an anticommons regime) are not incorporated into this
analysis.
The characteristic equilibrium for an anticommons is inefficient because the resource is not10
used at all.  However, if the transaction costs of rebundling the dispersed sticks are less than the
area a in fig. 1, then we expect the parties to consolidate the sticks and achieve the optimal level
of resource use at qRR=q*.  Society thus obtains a welfare level of a-TCreb, where TCreb are the
transaction costs of rebundling to achieve q*.  If TCreb exceeds the area a, then the net social
welfare level is zero.
3  If the resource is managed as an open-access resource, the welfare level of
society is the area -(c+d+e+f+g), unless the parties jointly owning the resource manage to agree
to exploit the resource in a collectively optimal manner, and organize institutions to ensure this, in
which case the net social welfare would be a-TCorg.  Joint management would occur if
a+c+d+e+f+g > TCorg, where TCorg are the transaction costs of organizing the joint owners to
agree on collectively optimal management of the resource.  In private property, the characteristic
equilibrium level of exploitation nets society a welfare level of a-e, where e is the deadweight loss
from the externality caused by the private resource use.  If the transaction costs TCneg of engaging
in Coasian negotiation are less than the area e, then the parties will move to the socially optimal
level of exploitation at q*, and welfare will be a-TCneg.  Finally, if the regulator is perfectly
welfare-maximizing, then society's welfare level will be a.  If regulatory failure such as fiscal
illusion or regulatory capture occurs, then resource exploitation will be too high or too low,
causing a triangular deadweight loss similar to area e, which we denote as e for the regulatory
regime.  Net social welfare of the regulatory regime is thus a-e.
We posit a social welfare function for the optimal property rights regime as
SW = max {SWAC, SWOA, SWPP, SWRR)
where SW is the net social welfare for the anticommons, open access, private property, and
regulatory regimes.  These take on the following values:
SWAC = max {0, a-TCreb}11
SWOA = max {-c-d-e-f-g, a-TCorg}
SWPP = max {a-e, a-TCneg}
SWRR = a-e
Note that -c-d-e-f-g < 0, so if  a < TCorg, then SWOA < 0 and open access will never be the
optimal property rights regime, since under an anticommons SWAC ³ 0.  Note also that in open
access, our condition compares the transaction costs of organizing with the benefits to society
overall of achieving a collectively optimal level of exploitation.  Many open access situations such
as fisheries involve a group of resource exploiters who may not necessarily "own" a resource but
because of their specialized knowledge of the resource, have effectively excluded all others.  In
this situation, the group of exploiters act as a private party, and if TCorg < a+c+d, they would
organize to exploit at level qPP, instead of q*, and would gain for themselves a+c+d.  An
externality suffered by the rest of society would persist in this common-property situation.
A fishery provides illustrative examples of all of the regimes.  The characteristic
equilibrium for open access represents the familiar condition of as rent dissipation (Gordon),
where fishermen obtain zero profits, while an externality is suffered by society overall due to a
lower biomass resulting from overfishing.  The fact that fishermen are rarely able to organize to
agree on joint management may indicate that the transaction costs of organizing are typically very
high in the case of fisheries.  The regulatory regime represents a welfare-maximizing fisheries
regulator with perfect information that successfully maintains fishing at an optimal level.  A
private property regime in a fishery would maintain fishing at a privately optimal level, but may
overexploit the resource in the sense that the fishermen may ignore non-use values for which
society at large has some non-zero value.  An anticommons fishery might take the form of a
bizarre partitioning of a fishery into unusably small territories, so that in effect nobody fishes. 12
Conclusion
Our framework highlights some interesting truisms and problems that persist despite
considerable policy efforts to fix them.  We see from our model that if the transaction costs of
organizing a group of people exploiting an open access resource are very high, then it is never
preferable to maintain the resource as an open access resource.  As Justice Louis Brandeis once
remarked, "it is better that the law be settled wrongly, than it not be settled at all."  The fact that
an anticommons is always preferable to open access when the transaction costs of organizing are
high is an economic reflection of this bit of jurisprudential wisdom.  Our framework also
highlights the importance of transaction costs in determining the optimal property rights regime.
Moreover, making direct comparisons of the transaction costs of organizing, rebundling, or
Coasian negotiation is erroneous -- these transaction costs must be compared with the potential
gains to stakeholders of achieving a more efficient level of resource exploitation.  Finally, it is
worth noting that different property rights regimes may represent different stages of evolution of a
system of property rights.  In the case of the Moscow storefronts, the anticommons regime is
simply an initial condition, and is likely to be rebundled once an entrepreneur manages to locate all
of the rights-holder, or once institutional reform lowers transaction costs.  At any rate, our
framework is ripe for further research, both theoretical and empirical.
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1 A divisible right contrasts with an indivisible right in a common-property situation.  For
example, a joint tenancy exists when two or more parties hold the same indivisible right to real
property, a small-scale equivalent of a common-pool resource.
2  Of course, many water rights are not transferable at all.  In California, the State Water
Resources Control Board must approve most water transfers, a divestiture of a water right that is
not held by individual third parties, but by society at large, giving rise to a "regulatory regime"
rather than an anticommons.
3This assumes that the transaction costs are fixed, and do not vary with the level of exploitation.